BYU Law Review
Volume 2016 | Issue 6

Article 7

December 2016

The Other Eighty Percent: Private Investment
Funds, International Tax Avoidance, and TaxExempt Investors
Omri Marian

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax
Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Omri Marian, The Other Eighty Percent: Private Investment Funds, International Tax Avoidance, and Tax-Exempt Investors, 2016 BYU L.
Rev. 1715 (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2016/iss6/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

The Other Eighty Percent: Private Investment Funds,
International Tax Avoidance, and Tax-Exempt
Investors
Omri Marian*
The taxation of private equity managers’ share of funds’ profits—the
twenty percent “carried interest”—received much attention in academic
literature and popular discourse. Much has been said and written about
the fact that fund managers’ profits are taxed at preferred rates. But
what about the other eighty percent of funds’ profits? This Article
theorizes that the bulk of such profits are never taxed. This is a result of a
combination of three factors: First, private equity, venture capital, and
hedge funds (collectively, Private Investment Funds, or “PIFs”) are
major actors in cross-border investment activity. This enables PIFs to take
advantage of international taxation planning schemes not available in
a purely domestic context. Second, PIFs are aggressive tax-planners. The
Article summarizes some existing evidence that suggests that PIFcontrolled multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) are more likely to engage
in aggressive international tax behavior when compared with MNEs that
are not PIF-controlled. The result is that PIF-controlled entities are
uniquely situated to avoid tax at the source jurisdiction. Lastly, PIFs are
dominated by tax-exempt investors. This enables PIF profits, which
escaped source taxation, to also escape taxation at the jurisdiction of
residence. The result is that most private equity gains from cross-border
investment activity are taxed nowhere. The Article concludes, therefore,
that PIF-controlled entities should be a target of international tax policy
making. However, such policymaking must be grounded in better
understanding of PIFs’ international tax behavior. This is a difficult
task, since PIF operations are rarely subject to public disclosure
requirements. The Article proposes opening PIF international tax
planning to public scrutiny through a revision of the country-by-country
reporting (CBCR) standards adopted under Action 13 of the BEPS
Project. It is hoped that information garnered from such increased
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. I received helpful
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reporting will assist in developing anti-tax-avoidance policies that are
better targeted at PIF-controlled MNEs.
INTRODUCTION
This Article links two seemingly separate academic discourses in
taxation which, for the most part, have run parallel courses without
significantly engaging each other. The first is the discourse on the
taxation of private equity funds, 1 hedge funds, 2 and venture capital
funds, 3 collectively referred to as private investment funds (“PIFs”).
The second is the discourse on international tax avoidance. 4
The common characteristic of all PIFs is that they pool funds from
private investors with significant financial capability and use such funds
to invest in portfolio companies. 5 The fund managers—who sponsor
the funds and raise capital from investors—are paid certain fees 6 and
receive a share of the fund’s profits if the fund is successful. 7
There is a large volume of literature on the taxation of PIFs. 8 The
bulk of the discourse, however, is focused on the taxation of PIF

1. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games, 146 TAX
NOTES 615 (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter: Polsky, Compendium]; Chris William Sanchirico, The
Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers With Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is
It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (2008); Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
2. See, e.g., David S. Miller & Jean Bertrand, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Hedge
Funds, Their Investors, and Their Managers, 65 TAX LAW. 209 (2012); Alan L. Kennard, The
Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW. 133 (2004).
3. See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation, in 3 TAX
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 47 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1989), http://www.nber.org/
chapters/c10945.pdf.
4. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016); Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Are We Heading Towards a Corporate
Tax System Fit for the 21st Century?, FISC. STUD. (forthcoming 2016); Yariv Brauner, What the
BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014).
5. THOMAS MEYER & PIERRE-YVES MATHONET, BEYOND THE J CURVE: MANAGING A
PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 1–40 (2005) (describing
private equity fund operating models); see also Miller & Bertrand, supra note 2, at 311–24. It is
important to note that private equity funds and venture capital funds share more common tax
features with each other than with hedge funds, and in some instance the discussion herein may
be more relevant to the first two. However, all three share the most important features for
purposes of this Article, which are (1) the pooling of private investors’ funds, (2) management
compensation related to performance, and (3) significant cross-border activity.
6. See discussion infra Section I.A.
7. Id.
8. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
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managers. 9 Academic literature frequently discusses the preferential
tax treatment accorded to the taxation of fund managers’ twenty
percent profits interest (known as “carried interest”) 10 or the
conversion of management fees from ordinary income to capital
gains. 11 Relatively little attention is given to the taxation of portfolio
companies held by PIFs 12 or of PIF investors that earn the other eighty
percent of the PIFs’ investment returns (left after the managers
claimed their part of the profits). Literature on PIF taxation also rarely
takes into account international tax considerations.
The purpose of this Article is to make first strides in filling this
gap. PIF investments account for a substantial part of cross-border
investment activity. 13 PIFs and their portfolio companies are able to
take advantage of multiple international tax planning opportunities
that are not available in a purely domestic context. 14 Thus, PIFcontrolled entities are uniquely situated to engage in aggressive
income stripping in the jurisdictions in which they operate,
eliminating source taxation. 15 Moreover, since a significant portion of
PIF investors are tax-exempt, 16 income stripped at the source is never
taxed at the residence jurisdiction of the investors. 17 PIFs are thus
particularly successful vehicles of so-called “double nontaxation.” 18 It

9. See discussion infra Section I.B.
10. Polsky, Compendium, supra note 1, at 616 (“[T]he carried interest loophole has
already been the subject of intense debate and scrutiny . . . .”).
11. Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES 743
(2009) [hereinafter Polsky, Fee Conversions].
12. For one of the rare example of a discussion of portfolio-level tax planning, see Gregg
D. Polsky, The Untold Story of Sun Capital: Disguised Dividends, 142 TAX NOTES 556 (June 2,
2014) [hereinafter Polsky, Disguised Dividends].
13. See infra notes 158–162 and accompanying text.
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. “Source taxation” or “taxation at source” refers to the ability of the jurisdiction where
meaningful economic activity takes place to tax profits from such activity.
16. See Polsky, Compendium, supra note 1, at 616 (“[L]imited partners generally do not
pay U.S. taxes, either because they are tax-exempt or foreign”). The magnitude of PIF investorbase tax exemption is discussed further infra at Section IV.C.
17. “Residence taxation” refers to the ability of the jurisdiction where investors reside to
tax the profits earned by such investors.
18. By “double nontaxation,” this Article refers to the violation of the “single tax
principle,” under which income from cross-border activity should be taxed once (not more than
once, but also not less than once). See, REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 40–42 (2007)
(discussing the Single Tax Principle). “Double non-taxation” violates the “single tax principle,”
since income is taxed nowhere (meaning, “less than once”).
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is therefore somewhat surprising that the international aspect of PIF
tax planning has escaped discussion thus far.
This state of affairs is even more curious given the centrality of
international tax avoidance to tax policy discourse over the last few
decades. International tax avoidance has played a major role in
international policymaking at least since the 1990s, when the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) launched an effort to combat “harmful tax
competition.” 19 More recently, the OECD has been engaged in the
Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (“BEPS”) Project. 20 The BEPS
Project is probably the largest ever internationally-coordinated effort
to address tax avoidance by MNEs. 21
However, within the context of BEPS (as well as other
international initiatives to combat tax avoidance), the role of PIFs has
been largely neglected. Current discourse is focused on tax planning
schemes executed by corporate MNEs, and on governmental practices
that may facilitate MNEs’ tax avoidance. This means that the focus is
on entity-level taxation, but the role of investors and corporate
managers in facilitating entity-level outcomes is largely ignored.
MNEs’ international tax avoidance behavior may be affected by those
who control MNEs.
In the context of source taxation, this Article proposes that PIFcontrolled MNEs are more likely to display aggressive international
tax behavior compared with MNEs that are not PIF-controlled. It
supplements previous empirical studies supporting this assertion 22 by
offering possible explanations to PIF-controlled MNEs’ tax-

19. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998).
20. See Base Erosion and Profits Shifting, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
21. See History, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2016) (stating BEPS comprised of thirty-nine countries accounting for eighty percent of world
trade and investment). Under the BEPS framework “over 100 countries and jurisdictions are
collaborating to implement the BEPS measures and tackle BEPS.” See OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
22. See C. S. Agnes Cheng et. al., The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax
Avoidance, 87 ACCT. REV. 1493 (2012) (finding that firms backed by activist hedge-fund
investors engage in more tax avoidance than similar firms not backed by hedge-funds); Brad A.
Badertscher et al, The Separation of Ownership and Control and Corporate Tax Avoidance, 56 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 228 (2013) (finding that firms backed by private equity funds engage in more
tax avoidance than similar firms management-owned firms).
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aggressiveness and concludes that PIF-controlled MNEs have fewer
constraints on source tax planning compared with other MNEs.
For example, some studies have found that MNEs’ tax behavior
may be somewhat constrained by reputational issues. 23 PIFs, on the
other hand, are rarely subject to public disclosure requirements. Such
opacity makes PIFs less vulnerable to reputational constraints.
Moreover, since the investment horizon of PIFs is limited, 24
management of portfolio MNEs may be less affected by long term
reputational risks. In addition, even if a PIF-controlled MNE suffers
negative reputational consequences due to aggressive tax behavior, it
seems unlikely that the PIF itself will be tainted; rather, the MNE and
its future shareholders are likely to bear the reputational risk.
A short investment horizon may also operate to negate MNEs’
interest in the long-term economic health of the source jurisdiction.
While MNEs have a clear interest in reducing their tax liability at the
source, they may also have an interest in the financial health of the
jurisdiction in which they operate. MNEs benefit from an
environment of developed infrastructure, skilled labor, and legal
certainty. In other words, MNEs’ tax planning may be constrained by
their interest in the source jurisdiction’s long-term public outlays.25

23. See generally Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal?
Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J. PUB. ECON.
126 (2009) (finding that share prices sometimes react negatively to news of corporate
involvement in tax controversies, though generally to a limited extent); John R. Graham et. al.,
Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field, 89 ACCT. REV. 991, 991
(2014) (surveying tax executives and finding that “69 percent of executives rate reputation as
important and the factor ranks second in order of importance among all factors explaining why
firms do not adopt a potential tax planning strategy”); Victor Fleischer, A Brand New Deal: The
Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (discussing the
effect of reputational considerations on the structuring of tax-planning schemes). But cf. Birgit
Huesecken et. al., Capital Market Reaction to Tax Avoidance: Evidence from LuxLeaks (2016)
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848757 (finding that
investors react positively to news about firm’s tax avoidance).
24. See discussion infra Section I.A.
25. See, e.g., REUVEN AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN, GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES ON INCOME TAXATION LAW 139 (2011) (explaining that reduced taxation may
incentivize foreign direct investment, but at the same time may hurt public outlays on
infrastructure, which creates a disincentive for foreign direct investment); Joshua D. Moore, The
Economic Importance of Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: An Analysis of
International Corporate Tax Harmonization Proposals and Lessons from the Winning Corporate
Tax Strategy in Ireland, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 345, 375 (2007)
(“[B]ecause MNEs benefit from tax expenditures and provisions of public goods and services,
they are unlikely to drive the rates to zero”).
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PIF-controlled MNEs, however, are not similarly constrained by such
considerations. Since a PIF will necessarily exit the jurisdiction within
a relatively short, known timeframe, its interest in the long-term
economic health of the source jurisdiction seems not as strong.
Another tax planning constraint that PIF-controlled MNEs avoid
is associated with the identity of their investors. Aggressive tax
behavior by MNEs may adversely affect shareholder-level taxes. 26
Shareholder interests may negate aggressive corporate-level tax
planning, to the extent planning creates investor-level tax burden. 27
Most PIF investors, however, are tax-exempt. As such, PIF investors
have little concern with shareholder-level tax, and in fact share the
manager’s interest in reducing portfolio-level tax. The only significant
taxable “investors” in PIFs are the fund managers, whose incentive
pay is subject to taxation. The result is that PIF portfolio-level tax
planning is largely driven by management-level tax considerations.
Finally, PIFs are rarely taxable entities themselves. They are usually
organized as pass-through entities, and as such are not viewed as
potential targets of tax policymaking. This may contribute to the
opacity in the context of PIF portfolio tax planning, which may enable
aggressive behavior to go unnoticed.
The fact that PIFs are particularly aggressive in source tax planning
is exacerbated by the fact that income is also rarely taxed at residence.
Under conservative assumptions, 28 about two-thirds of PIF interests
are owned by tax-exempt investors. PIF returns thus remain largely
untaxed at residence.
All of the suggested explanations for PIFs’ aggressive international
tax behavior demand further scrutiny. In order to address this issue,
we must better understand PIF international tax behavior. But such a
task is impossible given PIFs’ tax opacity. The main recommendation,
therefore, is to increase the transparency of PIF international tax
schemes. Transparency indeed seems to be a common theme of tax
reforms these days. 29 The OECD is currently engaged in the BEPS
Project aimed at addressing international tax avoidance. The most

26. See discussion infra Section III.C.
27. See Inder K. Khurana & William J. Moser, Institutional Shareholders’ Investment
Horizons and Tax Avoidance, 35 J. AM. ACCT. ASSOC. 111 (2013) (finding that long-term
institutional shareholders have a mitigating effect on corporate tax planning).
28. See discussion infra Part IV.
29. See discussion infra Part III.
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important contribution of the BEPS Project to international taxation
is probably the introduction of the CBCR requirement, which will
impose an increased reporting burden on MNEs, and is expected to
significantly increase tax transparency. 30 While CBCR is potentially
applicable to PIFs, this Article argues that under the current
formulation, most PIFs will not be subjected to CBCR. It is therefore
proposed to expand CBCR to include most PIFs. Increased
transparency will hopefully constrain aggressive tax planning by PIFcontrolled MNEs and provide better information, which is necessary
for formulating new tax policies that target PIFs’ aggressive crossborder tax behavior.
This Article is structured as follows: Part I explains some common
characteristics of PIFs’ operations and provides a brief background on
the taxation of PIFs. Part II explains the role of PIFs in the
international context. It uses a database of recently leaked documents
to explain the mechanics of international tax avoidance by PIFcontrolled entities. Part III suggests possible explanations to PIFportfolio international tax behavior, and explains the importance of
such issues to international tax discourse. Part IV turns the focus to
PIF-investors’ residence taxation, assessing the size of PIFs’ taxexempt investor base. Finally, Part V recommends expanding the
newly created tax transparency requirements, such as CBCR, to
include PIFs.
I. THE BASICS OF PIF TAXATION
This Part provides a brief background on the operation and
taxation of PIFs. Section A discusses the basic structure of PIF
operations. Section B briefly summarizes some of the tax
consequences to fund managers. Section C considers some of the tax
consequences to the portfolio companies.
A. PIFs: The Basic Structure
While PIFs vary in legal structure and investment strategies, their
basic operative model is similar. 31 Consider the following
basic structure:

30. See Brauner, supra note 4, at 105 (calling CBCR “a major achievement of the
BEPS project”).
31. For a review of private equity and venture capital funds’ business structure and
operations, see MAYER & MATHONET, supra note 5, at 27–40.
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A fund’s sponsor raises funds from investors who commit capital
to the fund. The sponsor then uses the funds to identify and purchase
portfolio companies (or other investment opportunities), manage
them, and eventually dispose of them, hopefully at a profit.
The fund itself is typically structured as a partnership for tax
purposes. The investors invest in the fund as limited partners. 32 The
limited partners’ capital commitments to the fund typically account
for ninety-nine percent of all capital commitments in the aggregate.
The additional one percent comes from the general partner, an affiliate
of the fund’s sponsor. 33 The one percent commitment from the
sponsor is intended to align the interests of the fund sponsor with that
of the limited partners by having the sponsor share some of the
investment risk.
Another affiliate of the sponsor, the management company (or
simply the “manager”), is tasked with the actual management of the
fund’s portfolio. In return for the management services, the manager
receives a management fee. The fee is typically calculated on an annual

32. Id. at 11 (referring to the limited partnerships as the “dominant form” of PE funds).
33. Id. at 34 (“Typically, investors in private equity funds see 1% as standard
and acceptable.”).
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basis, usually at a level of two percent of all committed capital. 34 The
management fee is usually paid on a quarterly basis.
The management fee is not the sponsor’s main monetary
incentive. Rather, if the fund is successful, the sponsor shares in the
profits. Once the fund investments are disposed of, 35 the realized
proceeds will first be distributed to the limited partners to pay them
back their capital investment, plus a pre-agreed rate of return (known
as the “hurdle,” which is typically set at eight to ten percent). 36 Any
remaining profits are distributed eighty percent to the investors (this
includes one percent to the general partner on account of its capital
investment), and the remaining twenty percent to the general partner
as incentive pay. Such incentive pay is known as “carried interest.” 37
The fund life is limited in duration. The manager usually raises
funds from the investors to finance investment during an “investment
period” that typically lasts up to five years. 38 The manager commits to
dispose of the investments and distribute the proceeds within a period
that typically lasts no more than five years after the commitment
period. Thus, a typical fund rarely exists for a period that lasts more
than ten years. 39 As a consequence, the investment horizon of PIFs
is limited.
B. PIF Managers’ Tax Consequences
The tax consequences of fund managers have been addressed at
length elsewhere. 40 The purpose here is to provide only the necessary
background for PIFs’ management taxation, and not to add to this
voluminous literature. 41

34. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 8 (“A general partner (GP) manages the partnership in
exchange for an annual management fee, usually two percent of the fund’s committed capital.”).
35. In some funds this is done on an investment-by-investment basis.
36. MAYER & MATHONET, supra note 5, at 33 (discussing the hurdle rate).
37. Id. at 32–33 (discussing the carried interest).
38. Id. at 11 (“The main part of the capital is drawn during the ‘investment period’, [sic]
typically 4 or 5 years, where new opportunities are identified.”).
39. Id. (“The fund usually has a contractually limited life of 7–10 years. The fund
manager’s objective is to realise all investments before or at the liquidation of the partnership.
Often there is a provision for an extension of 2–3 years.”).
40. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
41. For an excellent recent summary of this literature, see Polsky, Compendium,
supra note 1.
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Probably the most well-known aspect of funds’ management
taxation is the taxation of carried interest. This incentive pay,
amounting to twenty percent of profits, represents the bulk of the gain
to successful fund managers. Carried interest is clearly paid in return
for services rendered by the fund manager (that is, the successful
management of the fund investment). However, under current law,
the carried interest is not subject to taxation on the fund managers’
personal marginal tax rate like regular wage income. Rather, it is taxed
as if it represents a return on capital investment and taxed at the
preferential tax rates imposed on capital gains. 42
The management fees paid by the fund to the manager are taxed
as ordinary income to the fund manager, and are deductible to the
fund. This is a straight forward outcome, which is not particularly
favorable to the fund managers because the fee income is taxed at the
manager’s personal tax rate. While the payments are deductible to the
fund, the fund has little use for such deductions. The reason is that
the funds are usually organized as partnerships, which are transparent
for tax purposes. The deductions thus flow to the investors, who may
use them to offset their own income. However, most fund investors
are tax-exempt, 43 and thus have little use for such deductions.
Fund managers have therefore engaged in a tax planning strategy
known as management fee waivers. Fee waiver schemes vary in terms
and complexity, but generically involve managers waiving their two
percent management fee in return for priority allocations of fund gains
of the same amount. Managers then take the position that the fees are
treated as capital gains, rather than ordinary income. Commentators
have suggested that such schemes are extremely aggressive, and
potentially illegal. 44 The Treasury has recently addressed management
fee waivers by promulgating regulations to shut down most
such schemes. 45
C. PIFs Portfolio Tax Planning
Business entities are naturally interested in reducing their tax
liability to the extent legally allowed. However, the unique business

42. For an analysis of the taxation of carried interest, see Fleischer, supra note 1, at 9–15.
43. For a discussion of this strategy, see Polsky, Fee Conversions, supra note 11.
44. Id. at 743 (arguing that fee waivers planning is “extremely aggressive and subject to
serious challenge by the IRS”).
45. Disguised Payments for Services, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2, 80 Fed. Reg. 43652
(Aug. 19, 2015).
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model of PIFs may suggest there is something special about the tax
planning of entities controlled by PIFs. This issue has been largely
neglected in academic literature.
One exception to the dearth of literature on PIF portfolio
planning involves fees paid by the portfolio companies to the funds
that control them. Professor Gregg Polsky explains that fund
managers may charge portfolio companies fees for so-called
“management services” provided by the fund (or the fund managers)
to the companies. 46 Such fees, known as “monitoring fees,” are used
to offset the management fees so as not to alter the economic deal of
the fund. 47 However, while the economic substance remains
unchanged, the monitoring fees are deductible at the portfolio
company level, thus eliminating some of the portfolio-level tax
liability. The fund’s tax-exempt investors also benefit, since deductions
that are of no use to them are converted to portfolio-level deductions.
This presumably enhances the fund’s net return.
Except for the discussion of monitoring fees, there is almost no
doctrinal analysis of schemes aimed at reducing the entity-level
taxation of PIF portfolio holdings. To summarize, academic
discussion of PIF tax planning is almost exclusively focused on
management-level tax planning. There is very little discussion on PIF
portfolio-level planning. Moreover, cross-border tax issues are
virtually absent from such discussion.
II. PIFS AND THE MECHANICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE
The purpose of this Part is to consider PIF-portfolio tax planning
in the international context. Section A explains the motivation for this
Article’s question, a dataset of documents leaked in a scandal known
as “LuxLeaks.” An analysis of the leaked documents points to the
central role played by PIF-controlled entities in international tax
avoidance. Section B explains the mechanics of PIF portfolio planning
in the LuxLeaks context. It explains how PIF-controlled MNEs
eliminate taxation at both the source and residence. Section C
considers whether there is a broader-than-LuxLeaks argument to be
made, by surveying additional research pointing to PIFs’ aggressive
portfolio tax behaviors.
46. Polsky, Disguised Dividends, supra note 12, at 557–59 (explaining the monitoring
fees scheme).
47. Id.
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A. PIFs and the LuxLeaks Scandal
1. LuxLeaks: Background
In late 2014, the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (ICIJ) made public hundreds of advanced tax agreements
(ATAs) granted by tax administrators in Luxembourg to multinational
taxpayers. 48 The ATAs were leaked to the ICIJ by two former
employees at the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Luxembourg office.
The two employees were prosecuted and convicted for violating
Luxembourg trade secrecy laws. 49 An appeal is currently outstanding.
ATAs are by no means unique to Luxembourg. In transactions
where the tax consequences are uncertain, many jurisdictions allow
taxpayers to ask the tax authorities for a clarifying ruling that secures
the tax treatment of the transactions. 50 However, the Luxembourg
rulings did much more than simply secure the tax treatment of
complex transactions.
A previous article investigated the Luxembourg ruling practices at
length, and found that by securing a tax ruling in Luxembourg, MNEs
were able to reduce their tax liabilities in jurisdictions other than
Luxembourg. 51 Specifically, Luxembourg inserted itself as a conduit
jurisdiction between the source and residence jurisdictions. Instead of
financing a foreign investment directly, an investor would finance the

48. See Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies’ Secrets Exposed, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks (last visited
Sept. 23, 2016).
49. See LuxLeaks Scandal: Luxembourg Tax Whistleblowers Convicted, BBC NEWS (June
29, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36662636.
50. In the United States, such rulings are known as Private Letter Rulings or PLRs. See
Rev. Proc. § 2.01, 2016-1 I.R.B. 01 (defining letter ruling).
51. See Omri Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (“[A] process in which a national tax administration in one
jurisdiction, is consciously and systematically assisting taxpayers to avoid taxes in other
jurisdictions.”); see also INGA HARDECK & PATRICK WITTENSTEIN, ASSESSING THE BENEFITS
AND COSTS OF TAX HAVEN RULINGS – EVIDENCE FROM THE LUXEMBOURG LEAKS (2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2709629 (finding that although MNEs with Luxembourg ATAs
were able to reduce their global effective tax rate in comparison to MNEs without Luxembourg
ATAs, they were also subject to higher risk of audit); BIRGIT HUESECKEN & MICHAEL
OVERESCH, TAX AVOIDANCE THROUGH ADVANCE TAX RULINGS - EVIDENCE FROM THE
LUXLEAKS FIRMS (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2664631 (finding that by engaging in an
advance tax ruling through Luxembourg, firms have lower effective tax rates compared to nonruling firms).
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investment through Luxembourg. 52 As explained at length below, the
main outcome of Luxembourg’s ruling practices was to generate tax
planning opportunities that would not have been available had the
investor financed the investment directly.
2. PIFs and LuxLeaks
A previous article addressed Luxembourg practices in issuing
Advanced Tax Agreements (“ATAs”). The study used a hand-coded a
sample of 172 ATAs. The documents were selected based on the order
of appearance in the online database, which is arranged alphabetically
according to the name of the taxpayer sponsoring the submission. 53
The leaked ATAs were made available by the ICIJ in two batches.
The first, which included 548 documents issued to 340 MNCs, was
made public in November of 2014. The second batch of documents—
which was significantly smaller than the first—was made public in
December of 2014, and included ATAs as well as other documents
issued to thirty-three MNCs. While the ICIJ states that the first batch
of leaked ATAs contains 548 documents, the exact number of the
second batch of documents has not been explicitly stated by the ICIJ.
Moreover, the 548 figure attached to the first batch is not accurate for
purposes of the study. Not all of the leaked documents are ATAs. Some
of the documents consist of tax returns, tax preparation materials and
other documents contained in PwC’s client files. Such documents are
excluded from the sample. On the other hand, multiple ATA
submissions contain previously-issued ATAs as attachments. Attached
ATAs were coded as separate cases. Some sampling problems that are
associated with the dataset and the coding process are discussed atlength elsewhere. 54
Among the variables coded in the project were characteristics of
the taxpayers who sponsored the rulings. Figure 1, summarizes the
industry segment of the ATA sponsors. For that purpose, a “sponsor”
is defined as the ultimate owner of the Luxembourg entity in respect

52. Marian, supra note 51.
53. A caveat is that the dataset only contains ATAs submitted in English. The absolute
majority of the ATAs, however, are issued in English. During the coding, we came across eleven
non-English rulings: nine were in French and two were in German (the exclusion of which
reduces the potential sample size from 183 to 172). Since non-English rulings represent only
about six-percent of the full sample, we believe a sample of English-only rulings is still suitable
for a non-generalizable exploratory analysis intended to identify administrative practices.
54. Marian, supra note 51.
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of which the ATA is issued. In most cases, ATA submissions explicitly
stated the identities of the owners.
Figure 1 - Sponsors' Industry Segments (as % of sample)
Investment Pooling Vehicles

45%

Other Financial Services

16%

Construction/Manufacturing

11%

Insurance

7%

Real Estate

5%
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Retail

2%

Media and Telecom

2%
0%

5%

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

Figure 1 demonstrates the central role played by PIFs in
sponsoring Luxembourg ATAs. Private equity, venture capital, and
hedge funds (noted in the Figure as “investment pooling vehicles”)
sponsored about forty-five percent of ATAs, more than any other
industry segment. Other financial services firms, which may include
other types of private asset managers, account for sixteen percent of
the ATAs.
This finding is quite striking considering current discourse of
international tax avoidance, especially within the context of the BEPS
Project. Currently, the discourse is largely dominated by an attempt
to shut down tax schemes executed by multinational corporations
(MNCs) from research-dependent industries such as pharmaceuticals
and high technology. 55 Such MNCs are almost unaccounted for in the
sample. PIFs— which dominate the sample—however, seem to have
avoided scrutiny in the context of BEPS. This striking finding, which
demonstrated the central role played by PIFs in tax schemes through
Luxembourg, was the main motivating factor for this Article.

55. See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance,
62 UCLA L. REV. 2, 4 (2015) (“Intellectual property (IP) has become the leading taxavoidance vehicle.”).
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There may be multiple explanations to the large representation of
PIFs in the LuxLeaks dataset. It is possible that PwC had particular
expertise in serving PIFs, or that for some reason more PIF ATAs were
leaked than other ATAs. It is also possible that PIFs have non-tax
reasons to set up legal structures in Luxembourg. Nonetheless, the
sheer number of PIF-sponsored ATAs suggests a systemic practice of
international tax avoidance by PIF-controlled entities.
B. A Simplified Example of a Luxembourg PIF-Portfolio Tax
Structure
Given the apparent frequency of PIF’s portfolio-related
international tax avoidance, it is worth considering the mechanics of
this phenomenon. To launch a discussion on PIF-Portfolio tax
planning and its place within the BEPS framework, a simplified
example is presented. The example is based on a frequent planning
scheme in the LuxLeaks documents: conduit-financing with
debt/equity arbitrage.
Consider the following graphic illustrating basic PIF international
investment structure.

The basic structure discussed in Section I.A. is now altered in two
important ways. First, the structure segregates the LPs into groups
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based on their tax stances. For example, domestic taxable investors,
such as individual or corporate taxpayers, will generally be subject to
tax upon liquidation of their investment in the fund. Tax-exempt
investors, such as pension funds, governmental entities, and university
endowments, are—as a rule of thumb—not subject to taxation on
income from passive investments (that is, investment not actively
managed by such investors).
PIFs are structured to accommodate investors’ heterogeneous tax
preferences. For example, under U.S. tax law, tax-exempt investors
may face unwelcome tax consequences if they debt-finance
investments. Profits on debt-financed investments are taxable as
“Unrelated Business Taxable Income” (UBTI). 56 Since the fund itself
is treated as a partnership—which is mostly transparent for tax
purposes—any fund-level debt will be allocated to the partners
(including the tax-exempt partners). 57 This may result in UBTI to the
tax-exempt investors.
One option to avoid this consequence is to prevent the fund from
borrowing. This is a serious limitation on the fund operations, which
is unlikely to be acceptable to the managers or the other (non-exempt)
partners. In order to address the UBTI issue, and at the same time
allow the fund to debt finance investments, tax-exempt investors
would normally invest in the fund through a “blocker” corporation
organized in a tax haven. 58 Any fund borrowing can be done “below”
the blocker level, and as such, the debt is never treated as incurred by
the tax-exempt investors (but rather by the blocker corporation).
Since the blocker corporation is organized in a tax haven, the blocker
is unlikely to incur any corporate-level taxes.
Blocker corporations may also be used by foreign investors in
funds that operate in the United States. For example, foreign investors
in the United States may have to file U.S. tax returns and pay taxes on
income that is “effectively connected” with a “United States Trade or
Business” (“USTOB”). 59 If a partnership, such as the fund, is engaged
in a USTOB, partners are also considered to be so engaged. 60 In order
56. I.R.C. §§ 512, 514 (Supp. 2015).
57. I.R.C. §§ 704, 752.
58. For a discussion of the use of blocker corporations in fund structuring, see ANDREW
W. NEEDHAM, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS (TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 735), Part VIII.D
(“Avoiding UBTI/ECI with a Blocker”).
59. I.R.C. §§ 871, 882 (2012).
60. I.R.C. § 875.
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to prevent such risk, foreign investors may also use a blocker
corporation to invest in funds that hold U.S portfolio investments. 61
The second new aspect introduced to the structure, is to add a
cross-border element into it. That is, we now assume that the portfolio
investment is located in a jurisdiction that is different from the
jurisdiction of the LPs, the managers, or both.
1. The choice of financing structures
Assume now that the fund identifies an investment opportunity.
The fund now considers how to finance such an investment. Generally
speaking, the fund can finance the investment either with equity or
debt (or a combination of both). The tax consequences will depend
on such financing.
Assume the fund finances the portfolio company with equity and
that the investment is successful. Operating profits generated by the
portfolio company will likely be taxable at the source jurisdiction. For
example, if the investment is organized as a local corporate entity, tax
will be imposed at the local corporate tax rate. Dividends paid from
the portfolio company to the partners would normally not be
deductible to the corporation.
Dividends are unlikely to be taxable to the LPs upon receipt, or
only lightly taxed. There are several reasons for it: First, most
jurisdictions in the world would not impose tax on dividends received
from foreign corporations, if the shareholder holds a required
“participation” in the subsidiary corporation (usually ten percent of
the stock value). 62 Such systems, known as “territorial jurisdictions,”
generally only tax profits to the extent earned within their territory. 63
Thus, dividends that flow through the fund to the investors would
normally not be taxable at the jurisdiction of residence for the
taxable investors.

61. Using foreign corporations as vehicles for investment in the United States must take
into account additional considerations, such as branch taxes. See I.R.C. § 884.
62. Most U.S. trading partners have in place international tax laws that exempt all or most
foreign income earned by domestic corporations. For a recent survey, see Philip Dittmer, A
Global Perspective on Territorial Taxation, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/global-perspective-territorial-taxation
(“Overwhelmingly,
developed economies are turning to the territorial approach.”).
63. For a discussion of common themes of territorial taxation and participation
exemption, see HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 466–74 (3d ed. 2010).
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Second, dividends received by the blocker corporation would
probably not be taxable to the blocker given that the blocker is
organized in a tax haven. When the tax-exempt investor withdraws the
dividends from the blocker, the dividends will not be taxable to those
investors because of their tax-exempt status. Lastly, even jurisdictions
that tax profits on a worldwide basis—like the United States—offer
ample opportunities to reduce taxation on equity returns. For
example, the United States would not tax foreign earnings until
repatriated, which enables taxpayers to enjoy deferral. 64 This reduces
the effective rate of taxation on equity returns. Moreover, equity
returns are many times accorded favorable treatment in the form of
reduced rate of taxation on “capital gains” or “qualified dividends”. 65
Another issue to consider in the context of dividend distributions
during the time the investment is held by the PIF is withholding taxes.
Most countries impose some form of withholding tax on outgoing
payments, such as dividends, at a gross rate. 66 Presumably, dividends
paid from the portfolio company to the fund are subject to
withholding taxes at the source jurisdiction.
However, withholding taxes may be relieved by the operation of
bilateral tax treaties or other international instruments. 67 Under
common interpretation of tax treaties, the fund itself (assuming it is
treated as a partnership) is not entitled to enjoy treaty benefits given
its transparent status, but the investors are. Thus, if the taxable
investors come from jurisdictions that have a bilateral tax treaty with
the jurisdiction of the portfolio company, dividend withholding taxes
may be significantly relieved. Moreover, if the taxable investors and
the portfolio companies are both from member states of the European
Union, withholding tax is eliminated under an EU directive known as
the “Parent Subsidiary Directive.” 68
It is also possible for a fund to claim treaty benefits without
making the fund itself a taxable entity. Different countries have

64. For a detailed discussion of deferral and its benefits, see, for example, J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. et. al., Worse Than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79, 85–110 (2009).
65. I.R.C. § 1(h) (Supp. 2014).
66. Id. at 510 (“All of the systems here under consideration impose a gross-based
withholding tax on certain categories of income.”).
67. AVI-YONAH, supra note 18, at 74–75 (discussing reduced rates of withholding on
dividend payments, including through bilateral tax treaties).
68. Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation
Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States.
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different entity classification rules for tax purposes. 69 It is possible to
organize the fund as an entity that is transparent from the point of
view of the country in which it is organized, but as a corporation from
the point of view of the source country. Thus, when dividends are paid
to the fund, the source country would view the dividends as paid to a
corporation entitled to treaty benefits, but the residence jurisdiction
would view the fund as a transparent entity that is not the beneficial
owner of the dividends. 70
In order to prevent withholding taxes on payments that are
attributable to the blocker corporation, such corporations may be
organized in a tax-haven jurisdiction that enjoys withholding relief
(for example, UK tax-haven territories such as Gibraltar, which is
considered part of the UK for purpose of the application of the Parent
Subsidiary Directive). 71
Upon disposition of the portfolio company, the gain will generally
not be taxable at the source jurisdiction. The reason is that the gains
are capital gains, which are generally attributable to the place of the
residence of the investor. 72 If a taxable fund investor is a resident in a
territorial jurisdiction, such gains will not be taxed to the investors,
since territorial jurisdictions generally do not tax capital gains from the
disposition of foreign corporations as long as the participation
threshold is met. 73 Tax-exempt investors will not be subject to taxation
69. For example, in the United States, the tax-classification of business entities is
determined by a set of rules promulgated in Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-1 through -3 (the “checkthe-box regulations”). A foreign entity that is classified as a corporation for tax purposes, under
the law in the entity’s state of incorporation, may nonetheless be classified as partnership for
U.S. tax purposes under the check-the-box regulations and vice versa.
70. For a discussion of the use of such hybrid entities in the tax treaty context, see Philip
E. Postlewaite, Stephanie R. Hoffer & Matthew T. Kemp, The Adaptation of U.S. Tax Treaties
to Changing Business Forms: A Case Study of Hybrid Entities, 34 INT’L TAX J. 33 (2008).
71. On June 23, 2016, UK voters decided in a referendum that the UK should leave the
EU (commonly known as “Brexit”). See UK Votes to Leave EU After Dramatic Night Divides
Nation, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/
britain-votes-for-brexit-eu-referendum-david-cameron (last visited Oct. 18, 2016). This may
have a significant effect on corporate tax planning involving Gibraltar. See Jeannette Neumann,
In Gibraltar, Brexit Vote Stirs Fears of a Rocky Road, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-gibraltar-brexit-vote-stirs-fears-of-a-rocky-road-1466238118
(discussing the potential Brexit effects on Gibraltar’s tax attractiveness as an access point into the
EU market).
72. For example, under U.S. law the sale on non-depreciable, non-inventory personal
property (such a corporate stock), is sourced at the place of the residence of the taxpayer. See
I.R.C. § 865 (2012).
73. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
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on disposition gains on account of their tax-exempt status. For taxable
investors from worldwide jurisdictions, tax will likely be imposed at
preferred (or deferred, as explained above) capital gains rates.
To summarize, in the case of equity financing, income from a
successful investment is taxed once in the form of corporate-tax (and
potentially a small withholding tax on dividends) at the jurisdiction of
source. Income is generally not taxed again at the jurisdiction of
residence, 74 either as a result of the operation of the territorial tax
system, or on account of the fund investors being tax-exempt. Gains
to taxable investors are generally taxed at the residence jurisdiction at
preferred capital gains rates upon receipt.
The consequences are somewhat different if a fund chooses to
debt-finance the investment. In such a case, a successful portfolio
company would make interest (rather than dividend) payments to the
fund (as before, such payments would flow through to the investors).
Unlike dividends, interest payments are generally deductible to the
portfolio company and would therefore eliminate much of the taxable
income at the source jurisdiction. 75
On the other hand, interest receipts from foreign investment are
generally taxable to the creditors, which, in the case of a PIF, would
be the investors. 76 The result would be that, as in the case of equity
financing, the income will be taxed once. But this time, the income
will be taxed to taxable investors at their residence jurisdiction. Taxexempt investors would generally be exempt from paying tax on
interest receipts. This is certainly true of the interest collected by the
blocker corporation, since the blocker is organized in a tax-haven. This
means that, in the case of debt-financed investment allocated to a taxexempt investor, income is taxed nowhere.

74. In worldwide jurisdictions, income will be taxed only upon repatriation, since the
corporate subsidiary is a separate taxpayer. Only upon distributions from the corporate subsidiary
or upon the sale of its stock, may investors in the fund have income attributable to
that investment.
75. Many countries subject the amount of deductible interest paid to related parties to
deductibility limitations in order to preserve the tax base. In the United States, such anti earningstripping rules are found at I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012). However, it is possible to structure
deductible payments to the fund in other ways (such as royalties or services fees) that avoid the
limitation on interest deduction.
76. For taxable investors, interest receipts are rarely exempt from taxation. See AULT &
ARNOLD, supra note 63, at 467 (discussing classes of foreign exempt income and noting that
foreign passive income such as interest and royalties are generally not exempt from taxation in
territorial jurisdictions).
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As in the case of equity financing, upon disposition of the
investment the capital gains will not be taxable to investors in
territorial jurisdictions. Also as in the case of equity financing,
withholding taxes on outgoing interest payments to the fund may be
relieved under the portfolio company’s local law, 77 international law, 78
or by bilateral tax treaties. To summarize, in the case of debt financing,
income is also taxed once (but only to taxable investors), but this time
by the investors’ residence jurisdiction.
The following matrix summarizes the tax results in each of the
source and residence jurisdictions, in the case of equity or
debt financing.
Investor/ Tax burden on
Financing taxable investors
(including the
manager) from
worldwide
jurisdictions
Equity
Source:
Yes

Debt

Tax burden on
tax-exempt
investors

Source:

Tax burden on
taxable
investors from
territorial
jurisdictions

Yes Source:

Yes

Residence: Yes
Residence: No Residence: No
(Low)
Source:
No
Source:
No Source:
No
Residence: Yes
Residence: No Residence: Yes

Since most PIF investors are tax-exempt, one might expect
investor-level tax considerations to play a minimal role in PIF taxstructuring. Presumably, a PIF could simply debt finance investments,
and extract all profits in the form of interest (or other deductible)
payments. Interest payments would strip income at the source, while
at the same time generate little residence taxation due to the investors’
tax-exempt status. However, such a financing scheme ignores the fact
that all PIFs have one very important taxable “investor” who may
dislike that result—the fund manager. As demonstrated in the matrix

77. For example, the United States exempts from withholding most U.S.-source interest
paid to foreign lenders. See I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c).
78. The EU exempts from withholding most interest paid between companies in different
member states. See Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June, 2003 on a Common System of
Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made Between Associated Companies of
Different Member States, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 49 (EU).
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above, the manager would rather draw its share in the fund profits as
equity, taxed at capital gain rates, assuming this compensates for the
loss of source-jurisdiction deduction. If significant parts of the
manager’s incentive pay are received as interest, the manager would
face very high tax burdens, which might outweigh the benefits of
source-deduction. The issue of the managers’ and investors’ tax
position in respect of portfolio financing is discussed at length below. 79
Taxable investors from territorial jurisdictions share similar preference
with that of the manager, since interest receipts would be taxable to
them, while equity receipts would not.
2. What we learned from LuxLeaks: international tax consequences
with conduit financing through Luxembourg
It would be very convenient for the fund and its taxable investors
(particularly the manager) if the fund could finance investments with
hybrid financing instruments. A savvy fund manager might attempt to
structure an instrument that is classified as “debt” under the tax laws
of the source jurisdiction (where the investment is located), but as
equity under the tax laws of the jurisdiction of the fund manager (or
other taxable investors). In this case, payments from the portfolio
company to the fund would be classified as interest payments under
the law of the source jurisdiction, making them deductible at the
source. The receipts by the taxable investors, on the other hand, would
be classified as dividends under the laws of the residence jurisdiction,
and will be taxable at preferred rates (or not taxable at all if the taxable
investors reside in a territorial jurisdiction). Thus, the profits from the
investment would be taxed at low rates at the residence jurisdiction
(or not taxed at all). Unfortunately for the fund and its taxable
investors, such arbitrage opportunities are rarely available, since most
jurisdictions would uniformly classify the same instrument as either
debt or equity. 80
This is where Luxembourg enters the planning picture. Instead of
financing the portfolio investment directly, many funds finance their

79. See infra Section III.C.2.
80. For analysis of debt or equity classification for tax purposes, see DAVID C. GARLOCK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS Ch. 1 (2011).
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investment through Luxembourg, with a back-to-back financing
instrument, as depicted in the (much simplified) structure below. 81

As described in detail in previous research, 82 the fund could form
a Luxembourg entity, and finance such entity with an instrument (the
“top instrument”) that is designed to imitate equity risks and return.
The Luxembourg entity, in turn, would use the funds received from
the fund to finance that portfolio investment with a debt instrument.
This debt instrument would generate deductible interest payments
that would strip much of the tax base in the source jurisdiction.

81. Julien Bieber, Gaëlle Auger & Linda Taing, Private Equity Structuring in Luxembourg
– Key Tax Aspects, TAX PLANNING INT’L REV. 5 (June 5, 2011) (“Many [Luxembourg entities]
are financed through so-called ‘hybrid instruments’, which provide for a divergent qualification
of the instrument at the level of the [Luxembourg entity] and at the level of the investors, in a
view to optimise the cash repatriation and the overall tax charge.”). For an analysis of an actual
example of such financing structure, see Marian, supra note 51.
82. Marian, supra note 51, at 23–43.
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Presumably, the interest received in Luxembourg should be
taxable in Luxembourg to the conduit entity (Luxembourg’s
corporate tax rate is about twenty-nine percent, national and local
combined). 83 However, as described in the previous research, for a
small fee, Luxembourg would issue a favorable ATA to the fund.
Under the ATA, Luxembourg would agree to classify the top
instrument as “debt” for Luxembourg tax purposes, even though the
instrument is clearly structured to generate equity-like risks and
returns. 84 As a result, any payment made by the Luxembourg entity to
the fund would be deductible in Luxembourg. Since the debt
instrument and the top instrument are structured as back-to-back
positions, the deduction would completely eliminate the income in
Luxembourg (except for a small fee discussed below).
At the jurisdiction of residence of the investors (or the fund
manager), payments on the top instrument are properly treated as
equity returns (since the top instrument is substantively an equity
instrument). If the investors reside in a territorial jurisdiction, the
result is that the returns are not taxable to the investor. If the investor
resides in a worldwide jurisdiction, returns are likely accorded
preferred treatment and taxed at low rates. 85 Funds with taxable
investors from worldwide jurisdictions may also structure their affairs
to defer tax payments. For example, the top instrument could accrue
payments for Luxembourg tax purposes but not make actual payments
until liquidation of the investment. The accrued but unpaid liabilities
may nonetheless be deductible in Luxembourg under the ATA. 86 In
the residence jurisdiction, however, no tax will be imposed until
payments are actually made, since most jurisdictions do not impose
tax on notional equity returns. Tax-exempt investors are not taxed at
the jurisdiction of residence.

83. Corporate tax rates are taken from the OECD corporate tax database. OECD, TABLE
II.1 CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE, http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=58204 (last
visited Oct. 18, 2016).
84. Marian, supra note 51 at 28–43 (describing the process of debt/equity
arbitrage manufacturing).
85. In the United States, for example, most dividends would qualify for taxation at capital
gains rates. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012).
86. Under certain circumstances accrued liabilities are deductible even if not paid. See
PETER MOONS, BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN LUXEMBOURG (TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO
971), Part IV.F.4(a) [hereinafter LUXEMBOURG BNA] (“[Future] profit distributions and
accrued interest, are deductible.”).
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The result is that the profits from the investment are taxed
nowhere (or at very low rates at the jurisdiction of residence). By
issuing an ATA, Luxembourg effectively manufactured an arbitrage
opportunity that would not have been available had the fund invested
directly in the source jurisdiction. The implications of this practice are
profound, and discussed at length elsewhere. 87 Such manufactured
arbitrage opportunities seem to have been utilized by the PIF industry
more than by any other industry. 88
Luxembourg does not offer such tax avoidance service for free. In
the ATA, Luxembourg demands that the sponsor of the rulings book
income in Luxembourg based on a margin. The margin depends on
the face amount of the back-to-back financing. 89 The margin booked
in Luxembourg is then taxed at the Luxembourg tax rate. The margin
decreases as the amount of financing increases, much like fees that are
charged as a percentage of the amount of a bank wire transfer. Hence,
one may refer to such payment as a fee paid for tax avoidance services.
The effective tax rate (ETR) on the profits channeled through
Luxembourg can be calculated as follows:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =

𝑚𝑚 ∙ 𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖

Where m is the pre-agreed margin, T is the Luxembourg corporate
tax rate, and i is the return of the portfolio investment. The highest
margin charged by Luxembourg in the documents exposed by the
LuxLeaks scandal was 0.25% (for financing through Luxembourg of
EUR 25 million or less). 90
Assume that a portfolio investment of EUR 25 million generates
a 10% rate of return. If the 0.25% margin is taxed at the Luxembourg
29% corporate tax rate, the effective tax rate on the fund investment
would be:

87. Marian, supra note 51, at 45–50 (discussing the implications
arbitrage manufacturing).
88. See supra Figure 1.
89. Marian, supra note 51 (discussing margin determination).
90. See id. (discussing profits margins typically taxable in Luxembourg).

of
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0.0025 ∙ 0.29
= 0.725%
0.1

By securing a tax ruling through Luxembourg, the fund is thus
able to avoid source taxation in the jurisdiction where income is
generated (for comparison purposes, note that the unweighted
average statutory corporate tax rate in OECD countries was about
25.5% in 2010, while the average effective tax rate for 2008 was about
23.3%). 91 Instead, the fund is burdened by an absurdly low effective
source tax rate of 0.725%. If the taxable investors reside in a territorial
jurisdiction, no additional tax is imposed. If the taxable investors
reside in a worldwide jurisdiction (like the managers), they will be
taxed at preferred rates on equity returns, on a deferred basis. Taxexempt investors do not suffer any additional tax burden.
C. Are PIF-Controlled MNEs More Tax Aggressive than Other
MNEs?
The discussion of the LuxLeaks scandal provides anecdotal
evidence that PIF-controlled entities engage in aggressive
international tax avoidance. PIF-controlled MNEs account for almost
half of the LuxLeaks dataset. There is additional evidence suggesting
that PIF-controlled MNEs are more tax-aggressive when compared
with MNEs not controlled by PIFs.
Two studies questioned whether PIF-controlled entities are more
aggressive in their tax behavior, compared with similar non-PIFcontrolled entities. Badertscher et al. “compares the income tax
avoidance of management-owned and [private equity]-backed private
firms.” 92 Using a sample of private firms with public debt, they
compare PIF-backed firms with management-owned firms on several
measures of corporate tax-avoidance. 93 They find that managementowned firms “avoid significantly less income tax than [private equity]backed firms.” 94

91. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41743, INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE TAX RATE COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (2014).
92. Badertscher et al., supra note 22, at 229.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Cheng et al., 95 take a different methodological approach. Using a
sample of hedge-fund “activist events,” they consider whether hedgefund activism causes hedge-fund portfolio companies to change their
tax behavior. 96 When compared with a control group of non-hedgefund-backed firms, they find that “target firms have lower tax
avoidance levels than control firms before hedge fund intervention.”97
The implication is that active fund managers seem to pursue aggressive
tax planning for their portfolio holdings. 98
The empirical studies noted above use several financial measures
as proxies for the level of firms’ tax avoidance. Most such measures do
not necessarily measure tax avoidance in the international context.
However, some of the findings do suggest that PIF-controlled MNEs
make extensive use of cross-border tax strategies. For example,
Badertscher et al. examines the use of tax-haven subsidiaries as a
measure for the level of tax avoidance, and indeed finds that “[nonPIF-owned] firms have significantly fewer subsidiaries in tax haven
countries than PE-backed private firms.” 99
To summarize, although research on PIF-portfolio planning is in
its infancy, current studies strongly suggest that PIF-controlled
companies are more aggressive in their tax planning than other
companies. The anecdotal evidence stemming from the LuxLeaks
research complements and supports such findings, particularly in the
international tax context.
III. WHAT MAKES PIF-CONTROLLED MNES SUCCESSFUL
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDERS?
Thus far the Article explained PIF international portfolio tax
planning and argued that PIF-controlled MNEs may reasonably be
perceived to be more tax-aggressive than other MNEs, particularly in
the international context. This Part considers possible explanations for
this phenomenon. Section A examines some of the explanations
suggested in previous studies. Section B offers new explanations
associated with the PIF operating model.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Supra note 22.
Id. at 1495–96.
Id. at 1495.
See id. at 1495–96.
Badertscher, et al., supra note 22, at 246.
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A. Existing Explanations for Tax Avoidance by PIF-Controlled
MNEs
Existing literature provides several possible explanations for why
PIF-backed MNEs are more tax aggressive than other MNEs.
1. Separation of ownership and control
Badertscher et al. hypothesizes that ownership structures may have
an effect on firms’ tax strategies. 100 Particularly, they suggest that
“when equity ownership and corporate decision-making are
concentrated in just a small number of decision-makers, these ownermanagers will likely be more risk averse and thus less willing to invest
in risky projects.” 101 Since tax-avoidance is a risky activity, they expect
that “firms with more highly concentrated ownership and control . . .
avoid less income tax than firms with less concentrated ownership
and control.” 102
This explanation makes sense in the specific context of Badertscher
et al. which compares private equity-backed-firms with private firms
that are controlled by management. But such a particular comparison
lacks explanatory power when comparing private equity-backed firms
with publicly traded firms where, in many instances, ownership and
control are also separated.
2. PIFs’ tax planning expertise
Another explanation for PIFs’ portfolio tax planning, offered by
Badertscher et al. concerns PIF management tax expertise. Since fund
managers tend to “retain authority over tax planning,”103 they “have
substantial experience in owning and monitoring a broad set of
portfolio companies and their tax strategies.” 104 As a result, they
predict that PIFs “have the ability to generate economies of scale and
scope for tax avoidance at PE-backed firms.” 105 In other words, the
marginal tax planning costs for PIF-controlled firms are lower than

100. Id. at 233 (“In particular, we examine whether firms with more concentrated
ownership and control avoid less income tax than firms with less concentrated ownership
and control.”).
101. Id. at 229.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 234.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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those of other firms, which may explain some of the difference in
tax behavior.
This explanation seems sensible in the context of Badertscher et
al.’s narrow comparison of PIFs to privately held, management-owned
firms. It is not surprising to find that the cost of tax planning for PIFs
is lower than those of privately owned firms. However, there is little
reason to expect that PIF managers apply any more expertise in tax
planning, compared with tax managers of large multinational firms.
Such firms are not part of Badertscher et al.’s sample. MNEs creative
tax planning is well-documented. There is no evidence suggesting that
PIF managers are any better tax planners than the tax directors of
large MNEs.
Moreover, most PIFs have rather small internal tax operations.
Most tax planning work is outsourced to accounting firms and law
firms. On the other hand, large MNEs can handle most tax planning
activity in-house. The tax department at General Electric was reported
at one point to be almost 1,000 strong. 106 Under such circumstances,
it is difficult to believe that the marginal cost of PIFs tax planning is
lower than the marginal cost of any sophisticated large MNE.
3. PIFs as experts in value creation
Cheng et. al. suggest a different explanation for why PIFcontrolled entities exhibit particularly aggressive tax behavior. They
assert that “hedge funds’ informed monitoring is associated with
improvements in target firms’ tax efficiencies.” 107 PIFs are expert at
identifying firm inefficiencies. If a manager identifies an unexploited
tax-planning opportunity in one of its portfolio companies, the
manager will make sure the company takes advantage of
that opportunity.
This explanation makes sense, but again does not account for the
sophistication of tax professionals at non-PIF-controlled firms. It is
difficult to imagine that tax directors at large MNEs will fail to identify
tax-minimizing opportunities. Rather, as explained below, 108 when
similar opportunities are available to both PIF and non-PIF controlled

106. Jeff Gerth, GE’s Taxes: A Case Study, FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://fortune.com/2011/04/04/ges-taxes-a-case-study (“About 20 years ago, GE’s tax
employees totaled a few hundred and were decentralized. Today, there are almost 1,000.”).
107. Cheng et al., supra note 22, at 1496.
108. See discussion infra Section III.B.
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firms, non-PIF controlled firms may face certain constraints that
prevent them from taking advantage of such opportunities.
B. PIFs Business Model and International Tax Avoidance
While existing explanations for the aggressive nature of PIFbacked companies’ tax behavior may offer some insights, they present
two shortcomings. First, they do not identify behaviors that are more
likely to occur in PIF-backed firms than in large MNEs. Tax expertise,
low cost of tax planning, and the separation of ownership and control
all exhibit themselves in many MNEs, not only in PIF-backed MNEs.
It is therefore unclear whether such explanations account for PIFs’
seemingly unique portfolio tax behavior. A second shortcoming of
such explanations is that they do not consider the unique operational
structure of PIFs, and whether that structure has some bearing on PIF
portfolio tax behavior. This Section, therefore, offers additional
explanations to PIF-backed MNEs tax behavior, taking into account
the international context in which PIFs operate. It concludes that PIFbacked firms face fewer constraints on their international tax planning,
compared with non-PIF-backed firms.
1. Short investment horizon
Unlike other MNEs, PIFs’ investments are limited in durations by
the very terms of PIFs’ operative agreements. As explained above, it is
unlikely that a PIF will hold an investment for a period longer than
five to seven years. 109 A short-term investment horizon may have
several effects on PIFs’ tax behavior.
To begin with, the limited investment term puts much pressure on
PIF managers to turn profits in a relatively short period of time. This
may induce an aggressive tax stance to support the quick generation
of net profits. Moreover, the PIF management, which guides the
portfolio firm tax planning, may not be deterred by potential tax
audits. Unlike tax managers in other MNEs, it is likely that by the time
tax assessments against the portfolio-firm materialize, the PIF will
have long-since disposed of the portfolio firm. PIF managers are
unlikely to have to face tax authorities. At most, they will face demands
from the buyer of the portfolio company to indemnify it for any taxassociated losses. Of course, such tax risk should normally be priced

109. See discussion supra Section I.A.
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into a transaction in which a PIF disposes of its investment. But pricing
an unknown tax risk is an extremely difficult undertaking.
A short investment horizon may also alleviate the effect of
reputational constraints. In 2015, Walgreens’ public image suffered
gravely after it was announced that the company considered changing
its tax residence to the U.K. in a move intended to avoid U.S. taxes.110
Eventually, it seems that public relation considerations pushed
Walgreens to scrap its tax plan. 111 Walgreens had to consider the fact
that most of its stores are in the United States and a public relations
disaster might affect long term relations with its customers. Indeed,
several studies suggest that reputational considerations may constrain
aggressive firm-level tax planning. 112
PIFs are probably less sensitive to such long term reputational
effects. A portfolio company held by a PIF will be disposed of within
a short period. Any negative reputational effects of the company are
likely to burden the next owner of the company, not the PIF. A small
PIF-portfolio company is unlikely to appear on the radar of public
political consciousness during this short ownership period. Further,
PIF managers often reside in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction
of the investment and thus may not be completely sensitive to political
pressure originating in the jurisdiction. These special circumstances
suggest that PIF managers are less likely to take into account longterm reputational effects of aggressive tax planning.
Investment horizons have also been found to affect investors’
oversight over corporate tax planning. One study found “that firms
with higher levels of long-term institutional ownership exhibit
significantly lower levels of tax avoidance.” 113 In PIFs, no investor
owns a portfolio company for the long term, and hence, such
constraints on tax avoidance are absent.
Finally, short investment horizons may have an additional effect
on PIF-portfolio tax planning. A firm’s long term operation within a
jurisdiction is affected by the financial health of the jurisdiction. Firms

110. Bruce Japsen, Walgreens Says HQ Won’t Leave U.S., Never Intended ‘Inversion’,
FORBES (May 28, 2015, 11:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2015/05/
28/walgreens-says-hq-wont-leave-u-s-never-intended-inversion/#68c44c754381.
111. Alexander C. Kaufman, How Americans Scared Walgreens Out Of A $4 Billion Tax
Dodge, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/08/07/walgreens-tax-inversion_n_5655934.html.
112. See supra note 23 and sources cited therein.
113. Khurana & Moser, supra note 27, at 113.
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may have interest in operating in an environment of legal stability,
developed infrastructure, and skilled labor force. 114 Because of this, a
firm may be willing to share some of the burden associated with
government outlays that finance public goods.
However, due to short investment horizon, PIF-controlled
entities are less likely to be constrained by such considerations. Any
benefits of successful tax planning quickly materialize. The cost of tax
avoidance to the jurisdiction in which the PIF-backed investment
operates is unlikely to be felt by the PIF owners and managers, who
will have disposed of the investment long before such long-term
effects take root.
2. Aggressive tax personalities
Recent research suggests that “executives who appear willing to
push the envelope for personal tax savings appear to do the same at
the firms they manage.” 115 Chyz identifies a sample of executives who
manipulatively exercised stock options for personal tax gains and
classifies such executives as “suspect” of aggressive tax personalities.116
He then compares firms on several measures of firm-level tax
avoidance, in times when suspect executives were present versus times
when they were not. 117 Chyz finds “that suspect executive presence is
positively associated with tax sheltering” 118 at the firm level.
Since PIF fund managers retain control of portfolio firms’ tax
decisions, it is reasonable to expect that their personal tax tendencies
may affect their portfolio firms’ tax behavior. There is no study that
looks at the tax aggressiveness of fund managers in particular.
However, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence showing that fund
managers frequently take particularly aggressive tax positions. This is
most evident in the context of management fee waivers, where
multiple fund managers regularly took the position that their waived
fee allocations should be taxed at the capital gains rate rather than at
ordinary income rates. The mechanics of such arrangements are

114. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
115. James A. Chyz, Personally Tax Aggressive Executives and Corporate Tax Sheltering, 56
J. ACCT. & ECON. 311, 311 (2013).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 315–18.
118. Id. at 322.
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complex. 119 Suffice it to say that capital gain rates are usually reserved
for risky returns, while allocations on account of fee waivers often
came close to being guaranteed payments. 120 Guaranteed payments
from a partnership (the fund), to the partner (the manager), are taxed
at ordinary rates. 121 Such aggressive tax planning led commentators to
question whether fee waiver strategies pass muster under tax law,122
and it was eventually shut down. 123
If fund managers represent a class of aggressive tax personalities,
then Chyz’s study gives us reason to believe that such aggressive
behavior will trickle down to the funds’ portfolio companies. This
effect is exacerbated by the fact that fund managers’ tax interests
dictate the funds’ portfolio planning. 124 Given that most investors are
tax-exempt, fund managers are unlikely to be constrained by investors
with adversarial tax considerations.
3. Opacity
A final issue that may contribute to PIF aggressive portfolio tax
planning is the opacity with which they operate. Most PIFs are not
publicly traded, and as such are not subject to public disclosure
requirements. At most, publicly listed PIF portfolio companies are
subject to disclosure requirements in their own capacity. There is no
consolidated disclosure of PIF operations. This differs from any
publicly traded MNE, which must include consolidated disclosure of
its global financial outcomes. 125 Previous research shows that there is
a negative correlation between the quality of public disclosure and the
extent of aggressive tax behavior. 126 Opacity also further diminishes
119. For a discussion of fee waivers, see Polsky, Fee Conversions, supra note 11.
120. Id. at 766 (arguing that “a priority allocation of quarterly net gain is analogous to the
gross income allocation that was treated as a section 707(c) guaranteed payment . . . .”).
121. I.R.C. § 707 (2012).
122. See supra note 44.
123. Recent regulation promulgated under I.R.C. § 707 have shut down the most
aggressive forms of fee-waiver tax planning. Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
124. See supra Section II.B.1.
125. Publicly traded corporations report their worldwide financial results on a consolidated
basis. Moreover, under Action 13 of the BEPS Project, certain multinational entities will be
required to report certain worldwide information to tax authorities. See discussion infra
Section IV.B.
126. See generally Ole-Kristian Hope, Mark (Shuai) Ma & Wayne B. Thomas, Tax
Avoidance and Geographic Earnings Disclosure, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 170 (2013) (finding that
managers perceive opacity in geographical reporting as masking tax aggressive behavior).
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the constraints on tax planning that may be imposed by reputational
considerations. To summarize, the opacity in which PIFs operate may
enable aggressive tax planning to take root. 127
Moreover, PIFs themselves are rarely taxable entities. Most PIFs
are organized as partnerships, and, as such, are not subject to taxation
at the entity level. This, in turn, may obscure the role of PIFs in driving
tax behavior.
IV. PIFS’ INVESTOR BASE AND INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE
The previous Part explained the role of the PIF business model in
international tax avoidance. This Part turns the focus to the identity
of PIF investors. Many of the limited partners in PIFs are tax-exempt
investors. 128 Such investors include pension funds, sovereign wealth
funds, university endowments, and other institutions not subject to
taxation on passive investments. This Part argues that the presence of
non-taxable investors significantly affects PIFs’ tax behavior in two
important ways. First, the presence of non-taxable investors
significantly affects funds’ portfolio-level tax planning. The essential
argument is that taxable investors may have different tax interests
compared with that of the fund manager, and that such interest may
mitigate aggressive tax planning. Such constraint is largely eliminated
when most investors are tax-exempt. In the international context this
analysis is particularly potent because taxable investors may become
tax-exempt in a cross-border transaction if they come from territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, any tax effect associated with a large tax-exempt
investor base is amplified in the cross-border context. Second, a large
tax-exempt investor base suggests that income that is not taxed at the
source, is also not taxed at the residence.

127. Opacity may be mitigated when PIF holds a publically traded portfolio investment,
or when a disposition is made through an IPO. But in the case of an IPO, disclosure will only
happen with connection of the disposition. Tax planning during the holding period
remain opaque.
128. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 13 (“many LPs in private equity firms are tax exempt,
such as pension funds and university endowments”); see also Polksy, Compendium, supra note 1,
at 616 (“[T]he limited partners generally do not pay U.S. taxes, either because they are tax
exempt or foreign.”).
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A. Prior Analysis of the Importance of Non-taxable LPs to PIFs’
Tax Planning
The interplay between the fund and its non-taxable investors has
been subject to some analysis. 129 For example, if the fund managers
were to take all their profits from the fund as compensatory fees, the
managers would be taxed immediately at ordinary tax rates. Instead,
by taking their economic interest in the fund as a profits interest (the
“carried interest”), managers can defer gain recognition until the
fund’s liquidation, at which time the gain is taxed at preferential capital
gains rates. While this result is beneficial to the fund managers, it may
be detrimental to taxable fund investors. This is because, had the
managers opted to take the bulk of their compensation as
management fees, those fees would be deductible, flowing through to
the investors. Taxable investors value deductions and may be upset
with fund managers who deny them of those tax benefits. However,
tax-exempt investors have no use for tax deductions. When most LPs
in a PIF are tax-exempt, investors have no adverse tax interest to that
of the managers’ use of carried interest. In fact, the investors probably
share in the managers’ benefit in the form of lower fees paid to
the managers. 130
The analysis above concerns fund-level planning that benefits the
manager without harming other investors. There is very little analysis
of portfolio-level tax planning in the presence of tax-exempt investors.
One exception to this dearth of literature is Gregg Polsky’s analysis of
fund “monitoring fees.” 131 Fund managers typically charge a two
percent annual fee from the fund. 132 This fee is deductible by the fund
and flows through to the limited partners. However, such deductions
are of little use to the tax-exempt limited partners.
In order to prevent the deduction from going to waste, 133 fund
managers have engaged in a type of planning that converts portfolio
companies’ distributions into “monitoring fees.” 134 PIFs may charge

129. Polsky, Compendium, supra note 1.
130. See Sanchirico, supra note 1, at 1151–52 (describing how tax-exempt investors share
their benefits in the form of lower management compensation).
131. Polsky, Compendium, supra note 1, at 622–25 (discussing monitoring fees).
132. Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 622 (“If there’s anything a tax lawyer hates, it’s to see a perfectly good
deduction go to waste.”).
134. For a discussion of management fee conversions, see Polsky, Disguised Dividends,
supra note 12.
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their portfolio companies certain “monitoring fees” for
“management” and other services provided by the fund to the
companies. Presumably, under a typical fund economic deal, such fees
would be paid to the fund investors, pro-rata to their capital
contributions to the fund, as a return on investment. Instead, under
monitoring fee schemes, the monitoring fees are paid to the fund
managers to offset the two percent management fees otherwise paid
by the fund to the managers. Thus, the economic deal is not changed
(the investors lose the monitoring fees, but their management fee
liability is reduced by the same amount). However, a nondeductible
fund-level management fee is now converted to deductible fees paid
by the portfolio companies to the fund manager. Therefore, the fund
managers suffer no tax detriment (both the management fees and the
monitoring fees are taxable to the fund managers at ordinary rates),
but the after-tax return on investment is increased.
B. Tax-exempt Investors in the Context of International PortfolioLevel Tax Planning
The same game played with monitoring fees can efficiently be
recreated in the context of international tax planning. The idea is to
generate portfolio level deductions without creating additional
inclusions to investors or the fund managers. But in the context of the
tax rules applicable to cross-border transactions, this can be done to a
much greater extent than in the context of monitoring fees.
Monitoring fees convert a two percent management fee payment into
a portfolio-level deduction. International tax rules can do the same to
the bulk of a fund’s profits.
Consider, for example, a PIF with taxable investors from a
territorial jurisdiction investing in another jurisdiction. Taxable
investors would rather withdraw their return from the fund as equity,
which will not be taxable in their home jurisdiction. For foreign equity
returns purposes, such investors are effectively tax-exempt. This
change of status from taxable to non-taxable return is triggered by the
international nature of PIF investment and would not happen in a
purely domestic context. Taxable investors who would invest in their
own jurisdiction would be taxed in their own jurisdiction.
Payments that represent equity returns (such as dividends or
distributions that are treated as return on capital), however, are not
deductible to the portfolio companies. In effect, taxable investors are
faced with a choice between avoiding tax at the source jurisdiction
(debt financing) or at the residence jurisdiction (equity financing). If
1750
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the source jurisdiction tax rate is higher than the rate at residence, a
taxable investor would rather avoid taxation at the source by financing
with debt. PIF may seek to improve such outcome by turning equity
returns
to
portfolio-level
deductible
expenses
through
debt/equity arbitrage.
If investors are “true” tax-exempt investors (meaning, the
exemption is not conditioned on the investment being classified as an
equity interest), such planning is, in theory, made even easier. The
fund could simply charge the bulk of the return from the portfolio
company as deductible payments (such as interest, royalties or service
fee payments). This deduction would eliminate much of the portfoliolevel tax base, but will not be taxed to the investors since they are taxexempt. If the fund organizes its affairs wisely, the deduction would
also avoid any withholding taxes at the jurisdiction of source. Many
countries exempt certain types of deductible payments from
withholding tax (in particular withholding on interest payments or
payments of royalties are frequently exempt). 135
This brings up a second order question: if “most” PIF investors
are tax-exempt, why would funds go through the trouble of engaging
in aggressive schemes such as the ones exposed by LuxLeaks? Why not
just finance investments with debt? Why not simply charge portfoliocompanies intercompany deductible payments? Why does it seem that
the interest of some taxable investors dictates portfolio level planning?
The answers to these questions may be related to the fact that the
most significant taxable investor of any fund is also managing the fund.
The fund manager’s carried interest is probably the largest taxable
fund interest (twenty percent of the fund profits). 136 The fund
manager is able to push such planning particularly because such tax
scheme has no effect on the investor-level outcome of tax-exempts or
taxable investors from territorial jurisdictions (these investors do not
care whether investment return is classified as debt or equity return).
If the fund had a majority of taxable investors, it is not at all clear
that all taxable investors would approve of such debt/equity
135. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text (discussing relief on withholding taxes
on interest payments). Withholding on royalties is also many times relived. For example, the
OECD model tax treaty recommends no withholding on royalties in most cases. See OECD
COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, Art.
12(1) (2010). Inter-EU royalties and interest payments are also relieved from withholding under
an EU directive. See Council Directive 2003/49/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 49 (EU).
136. Supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
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conversions. Different taxable investors have different tax positions
and may be affected differently by portfolio-level planning.137
Consider, for example, a taxable investor who has loss carryovers. 138
This investor may prefer receiving interest returns, which will be offset
by the investor’s loss carryovers, rather than equity returns taxed to
the investor at capital gains rates. As another example, consider a
taxable U.S. corporate investor. It is not clear whether such investor
would rather receive interest or dividends from the portfolio company
because both interest and dividends may be taxable to the corporate
investor at the thirty-five percent corporate tax rate. Interest would be
deductible at the portfolio-company level, while dividends would not.
On the other hand, in some instances, dividends from foreign
companies may carry with them foreign tax credit to be used against
the investor’s U.S. tax liability. 139 A fund manager, in his or her
individual capacity, cannot use such credits. This creates an adverse tax
interest to that of the corporate investor. The bottom line is that in
the presence of taxable investors, the fund managers must navigate
through potentially adverse investor-level tax interests, which are
affected directly by portfolio-level tax planning. However, that
constraint is largely eliminated when most investors are tax-exempt.
C. Assessing the Size of PIFs’ Tax-exempt Investor Base
Arguments about the effect of tax-exempt holdings in PIFs rely
on the assumption that most PIF investors are tax-exempt.
Surprisingly, there is very little current research on the tax interests of
PIF investors. In 2006, Professor David Weisbach estimated that
about thirty-eight percent of private equity investors in the United
States were taxable investors (and as a consequence, up to sixty-two
percent are tax exempt). 140 A recent article that explored the size of
tax-exempt investors in U.S. corporations assumed, for
methodological purposes, that seventy-five percent of PIF investors

137. Omri Marian, Reconciling Tax Law and Securities Regulation, 48 MICH. J. L.
REFORM 1, 10–13 (2014) (discussing investors’ heterogeneous tax preferences).
138. Taxpayer may, under certain circumstances, carry forward past losses and use them to
offset future taxable gains. See I.R.C. § 172 (Supp. 2014).
139. See I.R.C. § 902 (2012).
140. David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interest in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV.
715, 722 (2008).
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are tax-exempt, but did not actually investigate the matter. 141
Executing a full-blown research project to accurately measure actual
investors’ holdings in non-public entities is methodologically complex
and certainly beyond the scope of a symposium article. 142 Instead, this
Section uses recent data to try to provide a reasonable assessment of
the current level of tax-exempt holdings (in terms of capital
investment) in both U.S. and European PIFs.
For European PIFs, data is available online from Invest Europe
(formerly known as the European Private Equity and Venture Capital
Association, or EVCA). Invest Europe publishes annual fundraising
reports that include, among others, the sectors of investors
committing capital European PIFs. Full data is available on Invest
Europe’s website for years 2007 to 2015. 143
For purposes of this analysis the following investor categories in
the EVCA data are classified as tax-exempt investors: Endowment and
Foundations, Government Agencies, Pension Funds, and Sovereign
Wealth Funds. Each of these investors are regularly treated as taxexempt under the laws of most developed jurisdictions. The following
categories of investors are treated as taxable for purposes of this
analysis: Banks, Corporate Investors, Insurance Companies, and
Private Individuals. For most years, categories that were clearly
categorized as exempt or taxable account for about two thirds of all
PIF investors.
The methodological difficulty arises in the context of the
remaining investor categories, whose tax status is unclear
(“unclassified categories”). These investor categories include Capital
Markets, Family Offices, Other Asset Managers, and an Unclassified
category. The reason for the inclusion of Other Asset Managers in this
category is that many of them may be investment intermediaries

141. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S.
Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 933 (2016).
142. For a recent paper that identifies the owners of pass-through entities in the United
States, see Michael Cooper et. al., Business in the United States: Who Owns it and How Much Tax
Do They Pay?, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Working Paper No. 21651, 2015). They find
that about 10.9% of U.S. partnerships’ income is accrued to tax-exempt and foreign taxpayers.
There is good reason to assume that the share of tax-exempt investors in PIF partnerships is
much larger. Moreover, tax-exempt and foreign partners that invest in U.S. PIFs generally invest
through foreign vehicles which are not captured by their study.
143. The data is available at http://www.investeurope.eu/research/activity-data/annualactivity-statistics/.
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themselves, or funds of funds (PIFs that invest in other PIFs).144
Family Offices are included in this category because family offices, at
many times, invest through non-taxable trusts that enable their
beneficiaries to avoid or substantially defer gain recognition. Capital
Markets are included in this category because Invest Europe does not
provide a definition for that category of investors, and it is therefore
not clear whether such investors should be counted as taxable
or nontaxable.
In order to assess the size of the ratio of taxable to nontaxable
investors in the unclassified category, the analysis takes two
approaches. One is to assume that the same ratio of
taxable/nontaxable investors in the classified categories applies to the
non-classified categories. This approach is reasonable, since many of
the unclassified categories of investors are private investment pooling
vehicles themselves (such as funds of funds or asset managers). It is
reasonable to expect similar investment patterns are shared across
similar types of private investment vehicles. The alternative
approach—following Rosenthal & Austin’s estimation of taxable
holdings in U.S. equities held through pass-through entities 145—is to
simply assume that half are taxable and half are not. 146 The fifty-fifty
assumption is more conservative than the methodology used by
Rosenthal & Austin, who, for purposes of their study, assumed that
seventy-five percent of PIF investors are tax-exempt. 147 The two
methods thus create a range of outcomes, which is summarized in
Figure 1 below.

144. Weisbach counts funds of funds as “taxable” in his estimation. This causes Weisbach
to overestimate the size of the taxable sector since many funds of funds’ investors are also
tax exempt.
145. Rosenthal & Austin, supra note 141.
146. Id. at app. 2.
147. Id. at 934, Table A2.
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Figure 1 - Size of Tax-Exempt Investor Base in European
PIFs
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The dark line in Figure 1 represents an estimation based on
assigning the unclassified category with the same ratio of taxable to
nontaxable investors in the known categories. The lighter line shows
the estimated size of the nontaxable investor base based on a fifty-fifty
assignment of taxable to nontaxable investors in the
unknown category.
Save for a drop in nontaxable investment following the 2008
financial crash, it seems that the size on the nontaxable sector of PIF
investors regularly outweighs the size of the taxable sectors, and that
the size of the nontaxable sector gradually increases over time. For
2015, nontaxable investors account for about sixty-one to seventy-one
percent of all PIF investors. Even with these striking figures, the
relative investment by tax-exempt investors to that of taxable investors
is probably understated. The reason is that, as explained above, taxable
investors from territorial jurisdictions are probably tax-exempt with
respect to returns from PIF investment, since the returns are drawn as
capital gains or other types of equity returns. 148

148. Indeed, at least in the United States, tax-exempt and foreign LP investors seem to
withdraw most of their partnership income in the form of capital gains. See Cooper et. al., supra
note 142, at 38, Figure 8.B.
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A similar method is applied to U.S. PIFs. Unfortunately, U.S. data
is not as freely available as in Europe. For purposes of this analysis,
data for the U.S. is derived from the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Private Funds Statistics Reports. 149 Since 2012,
private fund managers are required to report certain information to
the SEC. 150 Such information includes the classes of investors in
privately managed funds. The information is available on the SEC’s
website at the Division of Investment Management page. Full data is
available beginning with the first quarter of 2013. 151
For most periods, just under seventy percent of all investors in
U.S. PIFs can be reasonably classified as taxable or tax-exempt, with a
reasonable level of confidence. The following investor categories are
classified as tax-exempt for purposes of the U.S. analysis: Pension
Plans, State/Municipal Pension Plans, Non-Profits, Sovereign Wealth
Funds, Non-U.S. Individuals, Unknown non-U.S. Investors, SECRegistered Investment Companies, and State/Municipal Government
Entities. Foreign investors are classified as tax-exempt, because such
investors many times come from territorial jurisdiction, and are rarely
taxable in the U.S. on passive income earned in the United States.152
SEC-registered companies are classified as nontaxable because such
entities are frequently treated as RICs (“Regulated Investment
Companies”) under the Internal Revenue Code. 153 RICs are accorded
beneficial tax treatment that generally eliminates RIC-level taxation.154

149. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Private Funds Statistics Third Calendar
Quarter 2015, Feb. 16, 2016.
150. For a discussion of these recent disclosure requirements, see, Chris William
Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nationality, 68 TAX L.
REV. 207, 264–65 (2015).
151. See, e.g., Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. of Inv. Mgmt., supra note 149, at 2 n.2, (“The
Commission began receiving Form PF filings from Large Hedge Fund Advisers in July 2012. A
full data set was not received until March 2013.”).
152. Most industrialized jurisdictions employ some form of territorial taxation. See Philip
Dittmer, A Global Perspective On Territorial Taxation, TAX FOUND. Special Report No. 202,
Aug. 10, 2012, at 3 (Investment income sourced in the United States is rarely taxable to foreign
investors); see Avi-Yonah, supra note 18, at 68 (discussing how little revenue is collected from
foreign investment income in the United States, concluding that the exceptions for withholding
tax on investment income “overshadow the rule itself”).
153. I.R.C. §§ 851–855 (2012 & Supp. 2014).
154. RICs are required to pay most of their earnings as dividends, and may deduct
dividends paid. This effectively eliminates most of the entity-level taxable income. While RIC
shareholders may be taxable, an RIC’s ownership is dispersed (for example, mutual funds are
RICs), and the tax interests of particular RIC holders are unlikely to affect the tax behavior of
an investment fund held by the RIC.
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The following U.S. investor categories were treated as taxable for
purposes of the analysis: U.S. Individuals, Insurance Companies,
Banking/Thrift Institutions, and Broker-Dealers.
The following investor categories are regarded as unclassified for
purposes of the analysis: Private Funds and Other. The same
methodology used in the context of European PIFs is applied with
respect to unclassified investors in U.S. PIFs. The results are
summarized in Figure 2.
Figure 2 - Size of Tax-Exempt Investor Base in U.S. PIFs
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The investor base in U.S. PIFs is clearly dominated, at least in
recent years, by tax-exempt investors. For the third quarter of 2015,
between sixty-six and seventy-three percent of investment was made
by tax-exempt investors.
Notwithstanding the fact that the results presented herein are
merely estimates, they seem reasonable. They are consistent with
previous estimates by Weisbach. 155 They are also similar to a recent
estimate of tax-exempt investment holdings by Rosenthal & Austin,
who estimate that only 24.2% of U.S. equities are held in
taxable accounts. 156

155. Supra note 140, at 722.
156. Rosenthal & Austin, supra note 141, at 923.
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To summarize, this Section estimated that about two thirds of PIF
investors are tax-exempt. This implies that PIF portfolio-level
planning may be affected by the absence of taxable investors, whose
investor-level tax interests may conflict with the interest of the fund
manager. This effect is exacerbated by the fact that in the cross-border
context, otherwise taxable investors are functionally tax-exempt.
Moreover, the findings suggest that most earnings by PIFs are not
taxed at the jurisdiction of residence. Combined with the fact that
PIF-controlled entities are lightly taxed at the source jurisdictions, the
inevitable conclusion is that most income earned by PIF investors
from cross-border investment is simply never taxed.
V. ADDRESSING PIFS INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING
This Article has thus far established that PIF-controlled MNEs
seem to be particularly aggressive in their cross-border tax planning,
and considered some possible explanations to this phenomenon. PIF
investors are able to avoid taxation both at the jurisdictions of source
and residence. This Part considers why this is a problem worthy of
attention, and how to start approaching this problem.
A. How Big is the Problem?
PIFs are major players in the global economy. Private equity and
hedge funds’ assets under management have consistently increased
over the past few decades, to over $5 trillion combined in 2015.157
According to a recent report by Bain & Company, in 2015 private
equity funds raised $527 billion in new funds from investors, 158 made
$282 billion of new buyout investment, 159 and realized $422 billion
worth of portfolio investments. 160 To see how big these numbers are,
consider that the global M&A activity for 2015 amounted to about
$4.7 trillion. 161 In value terms, this means that almost nine percent of
global M&A deals in 2015 involved an asset disposition by a private

157. Id. at 934.
158. BAIN & COMPANY, GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2016, at 2 (2016).
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id. at 20.
161. Maureen Farrell, 2015 Becomes the Biggest M&A Year Ever, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3,
2015, 6:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/2015-becomes-the-biggest-m-a-year-ever1449187101.
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equity fund. This data does not include all hedge funds and all venture
capital funds.
With such huge deal values, significant tax revenues are at stake.
It is impossible to estimate the revenue effects of PIFs’ international
tax avoidance in a short symposium article. However, it is worth
noting that the revenue losses associated with carried interest planning
in the United States alone have been estimated at anywhere between
$18 billion to $180 billion for a ten-year period. 162 Such revenue losses
are largely attributable to the tax planning associated with managers’
carried interest. Namely, the revenue losses are attributable to the
deferral in recognition of twenty percent of the funds’ gains, and the
conversion of such gains from ordinary income to capital gains. This
Article addresses the rest of PIF gains, namely eighty percent, which
to a large extent seems to go perpetually untaxed. Surely if the
problem of fund managers’ tax planning calls for such a vibrant
academic discussion, so does international tax avoidance associated
with PIFs’ portfolios.
B. Improving Transparency
It is beyond the scope of a symposium article to offer a policy
prescription to solve the issue of PIF international tax planning. This
is so mostly because the problem is yet to be accurately defined. This
Article identified some evidence suggesting that PIFs are particularly
aggressive international taxpayers. It also offered some possible
explanations to this phenomenon. However, while all the explanations
proposed herein are plausible, none are proven. Much more research
is required in order to understand the international tax behavior of
PIFs. It is imperative to understand such behavior in order to try and
tailor policy solutions that will not be easily avoided by creative tax
planners, but also that would not unnecessarily stifle cross-border
investment activity.
The bottom line is that we need more information. The impetus
for this Article was a leak by a whistleblower that, for the first time,
offered us an opportunity to systematically assess the international tax
behavior of PIFs operating through one particular jurisdiction. And
this short glimpse into the world of PIF international tax planning is
162. Victor Fleischer, How a Carried Interest Tax Could Raise $180 Billion, N.Y. TIMES
(June 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/business/dealbook/how-a-carriedinterest-tax-could-raise-180-billion.html?_r=0 (discussing the different revenue loss estimates
attributable to the carried interest loophole).
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troubling. But it seems unwise to rely on whistleblowers to formulate
tax policy. Rather, a more thorough and systematic study is required.
The problem, however, is that PIFs are rarely subject to reporting
requirements and are rarely taxable entities themselves. There are
currently no sources to provide the necessary data.
Luckily, this problem is not unprecedented nor without solutions.
One of the greatest successes of the BEPS Project is the Country-byCountry reporting. For years, one of the main difficulties of tax
administrators in auditing MNEs was the fact that administrators only
had piecemeal information. MNEs engaged in aggressive planning
involving intra-group transactions to reduce their tax bills. The pricing
of transactions between affiliated entities were set so as to have income
generated in high-tax jurisdictions reported in low-tax jurisdictions.
The ability of each tax administration to tackle such issues on its own
was very limited, since taxpayers were only required to provide
information to each country as required by domestic laws. Each
country saw only one side of the intercompany deal but never saw the
big picture. Moreover, intercompany pricing reports are confidential,
so the public did not see the full picture either.
It took several outrageous media exposés showing how
intercompany pricing enabled multinational corporations to legally
eliminate billions of dollars of tax liabilities and how opacity
contributed to such schemes. 163 The BEPS Project engaged those
issues with Action 13, which established the framework for CBCR.
Under the CBCR framework, an MNE will be required to report its
worldwide operations both in its countries of residence and its
countries of operation. While the mechanics of such reporting are
complex, 164 the idea is pretty simple: to let tax authorities have the full
picture of MNE inter-company transactions. MNEs will have to report
not only the taxable income they have in each jurisdiction, but must
also report their activities, assets and employees in each jurisdiction
and properly document the methods by which profits are split within
the affiliated group. Thus, when a company with no assets or
employees reports a gain of billions of dollars while an affiliate with
factories on the ground reports no income, red flags will be raised.

163. Brauner, supra note 4, at 57 (describing media reports on corporate tax avoidance).
164. For the final CBCR report, see OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING
PROJECT, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING,
ACTION 13 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241480-en.
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The adoption of the CBCR standard has been described as “the
single most important achievement of the so-called civil society
involvement with international tax policy shaping.” 165 The OECD
introduced model CBCR legislation, and several model international
instruments including a convention for the exchange of CBCR
information. 166 Some countries have also unilaterally adopted or
intend to adopt CBCR rules. 167
Unfortunately, it is not clear to what extent a PIF would be
captured by the CBCR revolution. The reasons for this are twofold:
First, conceptually, it is difficult to envision the implementation of
CBCR in the PIF context. CBCR is largely intended to address
intercompany transactions between affiliated corporations. This is
sensible since corporations are taxable entities, whilePIFs, for the most
part, are not. PIFs are transparent entities. The beneficiaries of PIFs’
intercompany dealings are the investors, not the PIFs themselves. In
other words, PIFs are not taxable “parents” of affiliated groups. To be
sure, Action 13 specifically recommends that CBCR apply to
“investment funds,” 168 and a recent CBCR directive proposed by the
European Union seemed to be applicable to PIFs. 169 However, it is
unclear how—as a conceptual matter—CBCR would apply to a nontaxable entity that does not have to report its worldwide income to
any country, and, in many instances, is not even viewed as the owner
of taxable gains. Unfortunately, Action 13 provides little-to-no
guidance on how CBCR should be applied to pass-through entities.

165. Baruner, supra note 4, at 105.
166. OECD, MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE
OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTS (2015), https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-taxinformation/cbc-mcaa.pdf. As of October 2016, 49 countries have signed this instrument. See
OECD, SIGNATORIES OF THE MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT ON THE
EXCHANGE OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTS (2016), https://www.oecd.org/tax/
automatic-exchange/about-automatic-exchange/CbC-MCAA-Signatories.pdf.
167. For example, the Treasury Department recently proposed regulations to mandate
CBCR for U.S. corporations. Country-by-Country Reporting, Prop. Treas. Reg. 109822-15,
80 Fed. Reg. 79795 (Dec. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 1).
168. OECD, supra note 164, at 21 (“In particular, no special industry exemptions should
be provided, no general exemption for investment funds should be provided, and no exemption
for non-corporate entities or non-public corporate entities should be provided.”).
169. See Attracta Mooney & Chris Flood, New Tax Rules for Large European Funds, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/29982114-07dd-11e6-a623b84d06a39ec2.html#axzz4FAs5OGhr (discussing the application of CBCR to certain
asset managers).
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A second reason that PIFs may avoid CBCR is that CBCR is
limited by a value threshold. For example, Action 13 recommends that
CBCR will only apply to affiliated groups with an annual revenue of
at least EUR 750 million. 170 Few (if any) PIFs meet that threshold.
Most PIFs do not manage more than a few portfolio investments at a
time. Fund managers raise capital, invest, dispose of investments, and
then raise capital again for a new fund. Even if managers are successful,
it is difficult to imagine that at any given time many PIFs generate
EUR 750 million in annual revenue.
The main recommendation, therefore, is to extend the framework
of CBCR to ensure that it applies to PIFs. More specifically, it suggests
that CBCR should view PIFs as opaque entities. For reporting
purposes, PIFs should be viewed as a corporate parent of an
affiliated entity.
A second recommendation is to significantly lower the value
threshold of CBCR for PIFs, or to aggregate it over a period of several
years, so as to make sure that PIFs are captured by the
reporting requirements.
Like in the context of multinational corporations, it is hoped that
PIFs’ compliance with CBCR would provide information to tax
authorities, researchers and the public to better understand PIF tax
behavior and enable the promulgation of PIF-specific tax policies.
CONCLUSION
This Article was motivated by a leak of hundreds of ATAs granted
by Luxembourg to MNEs. An analysis of the leaked documents
demonstrates that PIFs are the most active industry in seeking taxreducing private rulings in Luxembourg. This finding is rather
surprising when one considers current international tax discourse,
which is almost exclusively focused on inter-company transactions
between affiliated corporations, usually from IP-reliant industries.
This raises the question: is systematic international tax avoidance by
PIF-controlled entities something that requires the attention of
tax policymakers?
The argument advanced herein is that the answer is “yes.” PIFcontrolled entities face fewer constraints on their international tax
planning, compared with non-PIF-controlled entities. Short
investment horizons mitigate the deterrent effects of tax audits,

170. OECD, supra note 164, at 39.
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reputational considerations, and investors’ oversight. Short
investment horizons may also contribute to lack of commitment to
the success of the jurisdictions in which PIFs invest. In addition, there
is some evidence suggesting that aggressive tax behavior by PIF
managers in their personal capacity may contribute to aggressive
behavior by the portfolio company. Finally, PIFs are rarely subject to
tax reporting requirements. This enables PIF to aggressively reduce
source-jurisdiction tax.
The largely tax-exempt investor base also contributes to PIFs’
aggressive tax behavior. Taxable investors’ tax liabilities may be
affected by PIF portfolio planning. Such investors may have tax
interests adversarial to those of the fund managers, and, as such, may
mitigate aggressive tax behavior at the portfolio level. Most PIF
investors, however, are tax-exempt. In the international context, this
problem is magnified because otherwise taxable investors become
functionally tax-exempt. In fact, in most PIFs the only sizable taxable
investor is probably the manager, whose carried interest is subject to
tax. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the manager’s personal
tax stance drives PIF portfolio international tax planning. Most
importantly, however, the sizable tax-exempt investor base suggests
that income that was not taxed at the source jurisdiction remains
exempt at the jurisdiction of residence. In other words, most income
earned by PIFs in cross-border transactions is unlikely to ever be taxed.
It is difficult to address such issues given the lack of information
we currently have about PIFs’ tax behavior. PIFs disclose very little
information. Research and resulting policy changes cannot seriously
be expected to rely on the goodness-of-heart of whistleblowers. We
need a systematic information collection system. Action 13 of the
BEPS Project offers such an instrument in the form of CBCR.
Unfortunately, as currently drafted, it is reasonable to assume that
most PIFs would avoid the CBCR requirements. Therefore, CBCR
should be expanded to ensure that most PIFs are included.
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